Deflationary bubbles by Buiter, W. & Sibert, Anne
ISSN 1745-8587 
B
irk
be
ck
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s 
in
 E
co
no
m
ic
s 
&
 F
in
an
ce
 
 
 
School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics 
 
 
 
 
BWPEF 0409 
 
 
Deflationary Bubbles 
 
Willem Buiter   
Anne Sibert 
 
 
 
 
July 2004 
▪ Birkbeck, University of London ▪ Malet Street ▪ London ▪ WC1E 7HX ▪ 
Deationary Bubbles1
Willem H. Buiter2 Anne C. Sibert3
2 July 2004
1We would like to thank William Brock and Narayana Kocherlakota for useful comments on
an earlier version of this paper.
2 cWillem H. Buiter and Anne C. Sibert 2004. The views and opinions expressed are those
of the authors. They do not represent the views and opinions of the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development. Address: European Bank for Reconstruction and Developement,
One Exchange Square, London EC2A 2JN; Email: buiterw@ebrd.com.
3Address: School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck College, Malet Street,
London WC1E 7AX, UK; Email: asibert@econ.bbk.ac.uk.
Abstract
We analyse deationary bubbles in a model where money is the only nancial asset. We
show that such bubbles are consistent with the households transversality condition if and
only if the nominal money stock is falling. Our results are in sharp contrast to those in
several prominent contributions to the literature, where deationary bubbles are ruled out
by appealing to a non-standard transversality condition, originally due to Brock ([4], [5]).
This condition, which we dub the GABOR condition, states that the consumer must be
indi¤erent between reducing his money holdings by one unit and leaving them unchanged
and enjoying the discounted present value of the marginal utility of that unit of money
forever. We show that the GABOR condition is not part of the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for household optimality nor is it su¢ cient to rule out deationary bubbles.
Moreover, it rules out Friedmans optimal quantity of money equilibrium and, when the
nominal money stock is falling, it rules out deationary bubbles that are consistent with
household optimality.
We also consider economies with real and nominal government debt and small open
economies where the government can lend to and borrow from abroad. In these cases,
deationary bubbles may be possible, even when the nominal money stock is rising. Their
existence is shown to depend on the rules governing the issuance of government debt.
1 Introduction
This paper revisits the existence of deationary bubbles and the conditions that rule them
out. We focus on two standard dynamic optimizing models with unbacked government-
issued money. In the rst model, money is the only store of value. In this framework
we obtain new results, demonstrating that the existence of deationary bubbles depends
on whether the money stock is increasing or decreasing. In the second model, money co-
exists with non-monetary nancial instruments, such as government bonds, that can be in
negative net supply. We show that the rules governing the issuance of these instruments
determine whether or not deationary bubbles exist.
The literature we are extending goes back to two seminal papers by Brock [4], [5].
Brock analyzes a closed-economy model with money, but no government bonds. In addi-
tion to the standard transversality condition (henceforth, the ST condition) associated
with the households optimisation problem, that the present value of the terminal stock
of real money balances is zero, Brock introduces an additional restriction. This restriction
(henceforth the GABOR condition) was later adopted by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [27], [28]
[29], Gray [14] and Azariadis [1]. It states that it must not be possible to increase con-
sumer welfare by increasing (reducing) current consumption by a small amount through
a reduction (increase) in the stock of current money balances and holding this lower
(higher) stock of money balances forever after.
In this paper we establish the following. First, unlike the ST condition, the GA-
BOR condition is not part of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimal
consumption-money demand programme.
Second, in a model where money is the only nancial instrument, we demonstrate that
deationary bubbles are consistent with the ST condition if and only if money growth is
strictly negative. This contrasts with results that have been obtained with the GABOR
condition. Even when the money stock is rising, the GABOR condition alone is not
su¢ cient to rule out deationary bubbles. We show that when the nominal money stock
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is falling, the GABOR condition rules out deationary bubbles that are consistent with
household optimality and the other equilibrium conditions of the model.
Third, we show that the GABOR condition rules out Baileys [2] and Friedmans
[13] stationary optimal quantity of money equilibrium, where the nominal interest rate is
zero, the (negative) ination rate equals the rate of decline of the stock of nominal money
balances and there is satiation in real money balances. This is true even when satiation
is achieved at a nite level of real money balances.
Fourth, without the GABOR condition, deationary bubbles can exist in the closed
economy model with both money and bonds, even when the nominal money stock is
rising. An example of a scal rule that supports deationary bubbles was suggested by
Woodford ([38], pp. 131-135), who discusses and provides examples of scal rules that
rule out what he calls "deationary traps".
Fifth, suppose that in the money-and-bonds model the solvency constraints of the
household and the government are asymmetric in that households view money as a re-
deemable asset while the government views money as irredeemable or inconvertible (see
Buiter [6] and [7]). Then if the government satises its solvency constraint with equality,
we show that deationary bubbles do not exist unless the money stock is falling.
Sixth, in a small open economy, we show that deationary bubbles can exist even when
the money supply is growing and even when the government views money as irredeemable
and satises its solvency constraint with equality.
2 Deationary Bubbles when Money is the Only Financial Instrument
2.1 The households
The economy is inhabited by a representative household and its government. Each period,
the household receives an exogenous endowment of the single perishable consumption
good and pays a lump-sum tax. It consumes the good and saves in the form of non-
interest-bearing unbacked money issued by the state. The household receives liquidity
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services from its money holdings and has preferences dened over paths of consumption
and holdings of real balances represented by
U = lim
T!1
TX
t=0
tu(ct;M
d
t =Pt); 0 <  < 1; (1)
where ct  0 is time-t consumption,Mdt  0 is the households end-of-period-t demand
for nominal money balances to be carried over into period t+1; Pt is the period-t money
price of the good and u is the extended real-valued utility function on R2+. We assume
that u is strictly increasing in its rst argument, concave and continuously di¤erentiable
on R2++, with uc(c;m) ! 1 as c & 0 and um(c;m) ! 1 as m & 0: We only consider
equilibria where the innite sum in equation (1) converges.
We temporarily assume that money is valued and thus, 1=Pt > 0 for every t  0. We
then only consider outcomes where this is true. There is, however, always a non-monetary
equilibrium where 1=Pt = 0 for every t  0. In this outcome, money is not held and the
household consumes its after-tax endowment each period.
Assumption 1. For every c 2 R++; there exists [u(c); u(c)]  R++ such that u(c) 
uc(c;m)  u(c) for every m 2 R+
We make one of the following mutually exclusive assumptions:
Assumption 2a (Satiation in real balances) For every c 2 R++ there exists
m^(c) 2 R++ such that um(c;m) > (=) 0 if m < () m^(c) and u is strictly concave and
twice di¤erentiable on f(c;m) : 0 < m < m^(c); c 2 R++g:
Assumption 2b (Bounded utility in real balances; no satiation for nite real
balances) The function u is strictly concave and twice di¤erentiable on R2++, um(c;m) >
0 and u(c;m) is bounded from above in m:
Assumption 2c (Unbounded utility). The function u is strictly concave and twice
di¤erentiable on R2++, um(c;m) > 0 and um(c;m)! 0 as m  !1:
The households within-period budget constraint is
Mdt =Pt  y    t   ct +Mdt 1=Pt; t  0; (2)
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where y > 0 is the constant per-period endowment and  t is the period-t real lump-
sum tax. In this section, we only consider outcomes where
 t  y +Mdt 1=Pt; t  0 (3)
The household maximises utility (equation (1)) subject to (2), taking as given initial
money holdings Md 1 > 0.
Su¢ cient conditions for optimality are given by the household period budget con-
straints (2) (with equality), the Euler equation
uc(ct;M
d
t =Pt) = um(ct;M
d
t =Pt) + (Pt=Pt+1)uc(ct+1;M
d
t+1=Pt+1); t  0; (4)
and the standard transversality (ST ) condition1
lim
t!1
tuc(ct;M
d
t =Pt)M
d
t =Pt = 0: (5)
The Euler equation and the budget constraint are also necessary for optimality. (See
Lucas and Stokey [25], p. 97.) The necessity of the transversality condition has been a
more di¢ cult issue. Weitzman [34] shows that it is necessary when within-period utility
is bounded. Kamihigashi [19] generalises this result to the case where, at an optimum,
the sequence of discounted within-period utilities are summable.
Equation (4) is typical of the Euler equations that characterise investment in a con-
sumer durable and has the following interpretation. The household is indi¤erent between
a marginal increase in period-t consumption, yielding utility of uc(ct;Mdt =Pt); and fore-
going this consumption and acquiring money; receiving utility of um(ct;Mdt =Pt) from
its liquidity services and using it to purchase consumption next period, with associated
discounted utility of (Pt=Pt+1)uc(ct+1;Mdt+1=Pt+1):
Equation (5) implies that either the optimal value of the state variable, Mdt =Pt; goes
1See Lucas and Stokey [25], p. 98.
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to zero as time goes to innity or that its marginal contribution to the maximized value
of the objective function, tuc(ct;Mdt =Pt); goes to zero.
Solving (4) forward yields
uc (ct;Mt=Pt) =
1X
s=0
sPtum(ct+s;M
d
t+s=Pt+s)
Pt+s
+ lim
T!1
TPtuc(ct+T ;M
d
t+T=Pt+T )
Pt+T
: (6)
2.2 Brocks restriction on optimal programmes
Brock [4], [5] proposes a further restriction on permissible optimal programmes:
uc(ct;M
d
t =Pt) =
1X
s=0
(sPt=Pt+s)um(ct+s;M
d
t+s=Pt+s): (7)
By equation (6) this is equivalent to
lim
T!1
 
TPt=Pt+T

uc(ct+T ;M
d
t+T=Pt+T ) = 0: (8)
His justication is that the consumer must be indi¤erent between reducing his money
holdings by one unit and enjoying an increase in marginal utility of consumption (the
left-hand side of equation (7)) and leaving his money holdings unchanged and enjoying
the discounted present value of the marginal utility of that unit of money forever (the
right-hand side of equation (7)).2 Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [27], [28] and [29] make the same
argument, as do Gray [14] and Azariadis [1]3.
The Gray-Azariadis-Brock-Obsfeld-Rogo¤(GABOR) condition given in (8) (or, equiv-
2Brock assumes u(c;m) = u(c) + v(m): There is no public spending; hence, in equilibrium c = y:
Denoting time-t real balances by mt, he says, "At some point in time, T; the act of taking one dollar
out of cash balances will yield him u0(y)=PT utils at the margin. His cash balances are depleted by one
dollar for all s  T: This loss of money services generates a utility loss P1t=T t T v0(mt)=Pt:::"(Brock
[5], p. 140). The same argument is also made in Brock [4], p. 762.
3Grays intuitive motivation of theGABOR condition (in [14], Section 4.1, and especially the argument
starting on p. 107 leading up to equation (29) on p. 110), is essentially the same as Brocks. The
GABOR condition can be written as limT!1 Tuc(ct+T ;Mdt+T =Pt+T )=Pt+T = 0: The ST condition is
limT!1 Tuc(ct+T ;Mdt+T =Pt+T )Mt+T =Pt+T = 0: Gray notes correctly ([14], footnote (21)), that when
the nominal money stock becomes a positive constant after some date, the ST condition and the GABOR
condition are equivalent.
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alently, (7)) cannot in general be a requirement for optimality. The reason is that if a
consumer converts a dollar into consumption (or vice versa) in period t and never un-
does that shift, he loses (gains) not just the reduction (increase) in money holdings in
period t and forever after. He also loses (gains) the terminal consumption that is asso-
ciated with a permanent reduction in money holdings. Without this eventual reduction
in consumption, the proposed perturbation of the optimal consumption and money de-
mand programme is in general not feasible because it violates the sequence of household
within-period budget constraints.
To see this, suppose that a consumer lowers his holdings of real balances by one
unit and increases his consumption in period t and then lowers his consumption T  1
periods later to restore his original money holdings. This leads to the period-t util-
ity gain uc(ct;Mdt =Pt): The loss of liquidity services before he undoes the shift equalsPT 1
s=0 (
sPt=Pt+s)um(ct+s;M
d
t+s=Pt+s): In period t + T the reduction in real balances is
reversed. There is no utility loss from lower money balances in period t + T or later,
but the restoration of money balances has been a¤ected through a reduction in pe-
riod t + T consumption by an amount Pt=Pt+T : The associated discounted utility loss
is (TPt=Pt+T )uc(ct+T ;Mdt+T=Pt+T ): When a household reduces its real balances in pe-
riod t by one unit and never reverses this, it is still required to reduce its terminal
consumption by an amount limT!1 Pt=Pt+T . The associated discounted utility loss is
lim T!1(
TPt=Pt+T )uc(ct+T ;M
d
t+T=Pt+T ):
Ignoring the last term in (6) or requiring it to equal zero may thus violate the house-
holds sequence of within-period budget constraints.4 Reducing consumption in period t
and increasing money holdings in period t and never reversing the shift is feasible, but not
rational. The correct characterisation of the perturbations of the innite horizon optimal
programme that should be utility neutral is therefore (5). Household optimisation does
not, in general require that (8) hold. Because of the prominence of the GABOR condition
4Whether it does or not depends on the relationship between ination and the discount factor. If
lim
t!1Pt+s=Pt+s 1 > , then the last term in (6) is zero if ct 9 0:
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in the literature, we state the following result.
Proposition 1 Given the Euler equation (4), the sequence of within-period budget con-
straints (2) (with equality), and the initial value of the nominal money stock, the GABOR
condition (8) is not part of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimum of the
households consumption-money demand programme.
This is obvious from Kamihigashis [19]) result that the household within-period bud-
get constraints, (2), the Euler equations (4) and the transversality condition (5) are the
set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimum. Condition (6) is an implication
of the Euler equation (4). Condition (8) is an additional restriction on (5), and therefore
on the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimum.
2.3 The government
The government is the consolidated scal and monetary authorities. Its within-period
budget constraint is
Mt=Pt  g    t +Mt 1=Pt; t  0; (9)
where g  0 is the constant per-period real public spending and Mt is the money
supply. Assuming g < yt ensures that the assumed restriction (3) can be satised. We
assume that (9) holds with equality.
We assume that the authorities adopt a constant proportional growth rate for the
money stock so that
Mt+1=Mt =   0: (10)
The sequence of real lump-sum taxes is endogenously determined to make the ex-
ogenous public spending programme and the constant proportional growth rate of the
nominal money stock consistent with the sequence of within-period government budget
constraints.
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2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, Mdt =Mt; t  0 and
ct = c = y   g; t  0 (11)
Letmt Mt=Pt: Substitute (11) into (4) and (5). We dene an equilibrium as follows:
Denition 2 An equilibrium is a strictly positive sequence fmtg1t=0 such that
uc(c;mt+1)mt+1 = [uc(c;mt)  um(c;mt)]mt; t  0 (12)
lim
t!1
tuc(c;mt)mt = 0: (13)
By equation (9), the taxes associated with the equilibrium satisfy
 t = (1  )mt + g; t  0: (14)
The GABOR condition (8) can be rewritten as
lim
t!1
(=)t uc(c;mt)mt = 0: (15)
The ST condition (13) implies the GABOR condition (15) when   1 and the GA-
BOR condition implies the ST condition when   1. The two conditions are equivalent
when the nominal money stock is constant ( = 1):
There are two potential types of monetary equilibria. First, given our constant funda-
mentals (y; g; ); there is a fundamental equilibrium where mt = m > 0 for every t  0:
Constant real balances clearly satisfy (13). By (12) such an equilibrium has
L( m)  um(c; m) = (  )uc(c; m)  R( m): (16)
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Wemake the following assumption, which given our previous assumptions, is necessary
and su¢ cient for a fundamental monetary equilibrium to exist:

8><>:>
9>=>;  if
8><>: Assumption 2a holdsAssumption 2b or 2c holds
9>=>; : (17)
If  < , then L(m)  0 > R(m) for every m > 0 and no fundamental monetary
equilibrium exists. If  =  and Assumption 2b or 2c hold, then L(m) > 0 = R(m) for
every m > 0 and no fundamental monetary equilibrium exists. If  =  and Assumption
2a holds then any m  m^ satises equation (16).5 Such an outcome is a Friedman
Optimal Quantity of Money (OQM ) equilibrium, where the nominal stock of money
declines proportionally at the rate of time preference and the household is satiated at a
nite stock of real balances.
When  >  a simple xed-point argument can be made to establish the existence of
a fundamental monetary equilibrium.6 For this case, the additional restriction that real
balances are a normal good at any xed point (that is, ucumm umucm < 0) ensures that
the fundamental monetary equilibrium is unique.
In additional to fundamental monetary equilibria, there can be a gamut of non-
fundamental (or non-stationary) equilibria. (See Azariadis [1]). A monetary equilibrium
can be stable, with monotonic or cyclical convergence; it can be unstable, with either
monotonic or cyclical divergence; there can be limit cycles and there can be chaotic
behaviour. We are interested in monetary equilibria where nominal real balances go to
innity; such equilibria are called deationary bubbles.
Denition 3 A deationary bubble is an equilibrium where mt !1.
When the nominal money stock is constant, a deationary bubble has the price level
5As c equals y g, which is constant, we surpress the notational dependence of m^ and u and u (dened
in Assumption 1) on c.
6By Assumption 1, R(m) 2   [(   )u; (   )u]. By the continuity of uc in m and Assumption
2a, 2b or 2c, L 1exists on  and L 1(R(m)) is a continuous mapping from the compact convex set
[L 1(((  )u); L 1((  )u)] into itself and, thus, by Brouwers theorem, there exists a xed point m
that satises equation(16).
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going to zero - the standard denition of sustained deation. With positive growth
in the nominal money stock, a deationary bubble can occur even with a rising price
level. Along such a path however, ination will be less than ination in the associated
fundamental equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Consider the class of preferences satisfying both Assumption 1 and one
of Assumptions 2a, 2b or 2c. If  > 1; then the ST condition is su¢ cient to rule out
deationary bubbles; the GABOR condition is not. If 1   > ; then neither the ST
condition nor the GABOR condition are su¢ cient to rule out deationary bubbles for all
preferences. If 1 > ; the GABOR condition rules out deationary bubbles not ruled out
by the ST condition.
Proof. Suppose that  > 1. By (12), uc(c;mt+1)mt+1=(uc(c;mt)mt) = (=) [1  um(c;
mt)=uc(c;mt)]  =: If the equilibrium is a bubble, then mt ! 1 and um(c;mt) ! 0.
Thus, 8 > 0;9 t > 0 and nite such that uc(c;mt+1)mt+1=uc(c;mt)mt > =    8t 
t. Let  = (  1)=: Then we have uc(c;mt+T )mt+T > (1=)T uc(c;mt)mt ;8T  1:
This implies limT!1 
Tuc(c;mt+T )mt+T > uc(c;mt)mt > 0 which violates the ST
condition (13).
If um(c;m) = 1= ln(m) for large values of m then a deationary bubble equilibrium
exists and the GABOR condition is satised for every  >  (See Obstfeld and Rogo¤
[28]) and the ST condition is satised for  = 1:
Suppose  < 1: Then examples of deationary bubbles that satisfy the ST condition,
but not the GABOR condition are easy to nd. See the text following.
The intuition for why the ST condition rules out deationary bubbles when the nom-
inal money stock is not falling is as follows. In equilibrium, in each period the household
must be indi¤erent between spending a unit of money on the consumption good and hold-
ing the unit of money, enjoying its liquidity services, and spending it on the consumption
good the following period. Thus, because money provides liquidity services, the dis-
counted shadow value of money used to purchase the consumption good must be falling
over time.7 Along a bubble path, real balances go to innity and the liquidity services of
7The time-t discounted shadow value to the household of a unit of money used for purchasing the
good is the incremental contribution to U in equation (1), (t=Pt)uc(c;Mt=Pt).
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a unit of money go to zero. Thus, the rate of decrease over time in the discounted shadow
value of money used to purchase consumption goes to zero. If the nominal money stock is
constant or growing at a constant rate over time, this implies that the value of the entire
money stock when priced at the discounted shadow value of money used to purchase the
consumption good, becomes constant or rises over time. This is inconsistent with the ST
condition, which says that the present discounted shadow value of the economys money
stock must go to zero in the long run. If the nominal money stock is falling at a constant
rate over time, then the discounted shadow value of the entire money stock when used to
purchase the consumption good must be falling as well.8
When  > 1, the GABOR condition is a weaker condition than the ST condition and
it is not su¢ cient to rule out deationary bubbles. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [28] show that
the GABOR condition is su¢ cient to rule out deationary bubbles if Assumptions 2a or
2b are satised. Brock [4] provides a weaker condition.
Proposition 5 (Brocks Result) The GABOR condition is su¢ cient to rule out dea-
tionary bubbles if there exists  < 0 and nite m0 > 0 such that m > m0 implies
v0(m)  m:
When  <  < 1, imposing the GABOR condition rules out deationary bubbles that
satisfy the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of the consumers problem. For example,
suppose that u(c;m) = h(c) +
 
m1    1 =(1   ) when 0 <  6= 1 and u(c;m) =
h(c) + ln c when  ! 1: Let   1=h0(c). Then, there is a steady state at m = [=( 
)]1=: We have dmt+1=dmt =    [(1   )(   )=] (mt= m)  > 0 if mt > m and
dmt+1=dmt =    (1  )(  )= > 1 if mt = m. Thus, the steady state is not stable
and if m0 > m, the equilibrium is a deationary bubble. This utility function satises
Brocks condition; hence, it does not satisfy the GABOR condition. We have mt+1=mt =
(=)
 
1  m1 t

; hence limt!1 
tuc(c;mt)mt = (1=) limt!1 t
Qt
s=0
 
1  m1 t

=
0. Thus, the equilibrium is not ruled out by the ST condition. A particularly transparent
8This argument suggests that if  < 1, then any sequence of real balances that goes to in-
nity and satises (12) must satisfy the ST condition and this is true. In this case, by (12),
uc(c;mt+1)mt+1=(uc(c;mt)mt) < =. This implies 
Tuc(c;mt+T )mt+T < 
Tuc(c;mt)mt ! 0:
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example is the case where  = 1: Thenmt = (m0  m) (=)t+ m satises (12). Ifm0 > m
then mt !1 and clearly the ST condition is satised, but not the GABOR condition.
Proposition 6 The GABOR condition rules out Friedmans Optimal Quantity of Money
equilibrium; the ST condition does not.
Proof. Friedmans OQM equilibrium (any fundamental equilibrium supported by  =
) has (=)tuc(c;mt)mt = uc(c; m) m > 0; with m  m^; hence GABOR is not satised.
It has tuc(c;mt)mt = 
tuc(c; m) m! 0; hence, the ST condition is satised.
The GABOR condition rules out Friedmans where  =  and households are satiated
in real balances.9 It is easily veried that in the model of this section and in the model with
money and bonds in Section 3 that if Assumption 2a holds, Friedmans OQM equilibrium
is the households most preferred outcome.
The intuition for why theGABOR condition cannot be part of the households optimal
programme is particularly stark in this case. The GABOR condition is a statement
that the household must be indi¤erent between reducing his money holdings by one
unit and using this extra unit of money to purchase consumption and holding the unit
of money forever and enjoying the discounted present value of the resulting liquidity
services. However, as the household is satiated in real balances in the OQM equilibrium,
it would hold an extra unit of money as a pure store of value only in order to increase
its consumption at some time in the future. At some point in the future, the incremental
unit of money must be exchanged for the consumption good if the earlier sacrice of
consumption is to be rational.
We now show that when money growth equals the discount factor and there is satiation
in real balances, deationary bubbles cannot exist. This is a consequence of the Euler
equation, rather than the ST condition.
Proposition 7 If  =  < 1 and Assumption 2a holds, then deationary bubbles cannot
exist.
9The neoclassical or intertemporal public nance theory of the optimal quantity of money is a vast
subject. See, for example, Bailey [2] , Friedman [13], Wilson [37] and Cohen [9],
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Proof. When  = ; equation (12) becomes uc(c;mt+1)mt+1 = [uc(c;mt) um(c;mt)]mt; t 
0: If there exists a solution that has money balances rising without bound, then at some
point, mt > m^(c): By Assumption 2a, if m > m^(c) then um(c;m) = 0; and we have
uc(c;mt+1)mt+1 = uc(c;mt)mt: For this to support mt rising without bound, we require
uc(c;mt)=uc(c;mt+1) > 1. For this to be be possible, ucm(c;m) < 0: This is a contradic-
tion, however, as ucm(c;mt) = 0 for mt > m^(c):
We have assumed that   . If this is not the case, it is easy to nd examples of
non-fundamental equilibria, but deationary bubbles cannot exist. This result is also a
consequence of the Euler equation, rather than the ST condition.
Proposition 8 If  <  then deationary bubbles cannot exist.
Proof. Rewrite equation (12) asmt+1 = (=)[uc(c;mt)=uc(c;mt+1) uc(c;mt)=uc(c;mt+1)]mt.
For fmtg ! 1, there must be a subsequence fmtkg such that uc(c;mtk)=uc(c;mtk+1) >
= > 1: This implies, uc(c;mtk)! 0; which is not possible as it violates Assumption 1.
3 Deationary Bubbles with Money and Government Bonds
In the money-only model of Section 2, the household transversality condition requires that
the present discounted value of the households terminal stock of real money balances is
zero. When there are nancial and/or real assets besides money, and asset markets
are e¢ cient, then the corresponding household transversality condition (plus a solvency
constraint) implies that the present discounted value of the households terminal aggregate
net non-human wealth is zero. In the money-only model, if the nominal money stock is
not falling, then any path of real balances that satises the households Euler equation
and goes to innity produces a path of present discounted values of real money balances
that eventually rises or remains constant at some positive value, violating the households
transversality condition.
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Woodford [38] suggests that if an additional nancial asset were available that could
have a strictly negative supply, then the household transversality condition might be
satised even if the discounted value of the households real balances does not go to zero.
In this section we analyse the case were the government issues real and nominal debt
as well as unbacked money and we show that Woodfords conjecture is correct when the
government follows a tax rule which implies that the governments solvency constraint
is satised with strict inequality along a deationary bubble path. We also show that
the conjecture is not correct if the government follows a tax rule which implies that the
government satises its solvency constraint with equality. This is a consequence of the
asymmetry of the government and household budget constraints. The household views
its terminal money stock as an asset. The government views money as irredeemable;
hence, it does not view the terminal money stock as a liability.
3.1 Households
We now assume that the government issues nominal and real bonds, in addition to money.
Nominal bonds pay a nominal interest rate of it in period t on debt acquired in period
t  1; real bonds pay a real interest rate of rt in period t on debt acquired at t  1. Since
the nominal interest rate on money is assumed to be zero, an equilibrium with valued
nominal bonds requires that the nominal interest rate be non-negative. We only consider
monetary rules that support such equilibria. Equilibria where both nominal and real
bonds are held require that the returns on these assets are equalised. Thus
(1 + rt+1)Pt+1=Pt = 1 + it+1; t  0: (18)
Denote the period-t household demand for nominal bonds by Bdt and the period-t
demand for real bonds by ddt : Let a
d
t  mdt + bdt + ddt be the real value of the households
time-t demand for nancial wealth, where bdt  Bdt =Pt: The households within-period
budget constraint is
14
adt = (1 + rt)a
d
t 1 + y    t   ct   (itPt 1=Pt)mdt 1: (19)
The household faces a solvency constraint: it cannot run a Ponzi scheme where it
borrows ever-increasing amounts to service its previously accumulated debt. Thus, the
present discounted value of the households terminal nancial wealth has to be non-
negative:
lim
t!1
adt =
Qt
s=0(1 + rs)  0: (20)
We assume that the households initial holdings of money, nominal bonds and real
bonds, M 1 > 0, B 1 and d 1, respectively, are given.10
The (interior) optimality conditions for the household are, for t  0; are (19) and
um(ct;m
d
t )
uc(ct;mdt )
=
it+1
1 + it+1
(21)
(1 + rt+1)uc
 
ct+1;m
d
t+1

= uc
 
ct;m
d
t

(22)
lim
t!1
tuc(ct;m
d
t )a
d
t = 0: (23)
Equation (21) is the familiar e¢ ciency condition relating period-t money demand to
period-t consumption. Equation (22) is the households consumption Euler equation.
Equation (23) is the the ST condition for the money-and-bonds model.
It is common in the economics literature to replace the single transversality condition
(23) with multiple transversality conditions, one for each component of nancial wealth.
Turnovsky [33], p. 389 and McCallum [26], for example, model households that hold
money and bonds and impose two transversality conditions, one requiring that the dis-
counted terminal shadow value of debt be zero and one requiring that the discounted
10In the money-and-bonds model too, we do not consider the non-monetary equilibrium with P 1t =
0; t  0:
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terminal shadow value of money be zero. Other recent papers that take this approach
are Jha, Wang and Yip [18], Chuang and Huo [8] and Schabert [31]. While multiple
transversality conditions may help rule out inationary bubbles and explosive debt, only
one transversality condition is part of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a house-
hold optimum. When the consumers optimisation problem is written as a discrete-time
Hamiltonian control problem, there is a single state variable, real aggregate nancial
wealth, ad, and two control variables, consumption, c, and real money balances, md:
There is a single transversality condition involving the state variable ad. There is no sep-
arate transversality condition requiring the present discounted shadow value of terminal
real money balances to equal zero. The economic reason for this is that nancial markets
are assumed to be frictionless: households can costlessly and instantaneously change the
composition of their portfolios between money and bonds.
It follows from equations (22), (23) and Assumption 1, that the household solvency
constraint (20) holds with equality:
lim
t!1
adt =
Qt
s=0(1 + rs) = 0: (24)
3.2 The government
The governments outstanding stocks of nominal and real bonds at the beginning of period
t are denoted by Bt 1 and dt 1; respectively. Let bt  Bt=Pt and at  mt + bt + dt: The
governments period-t budget constraint is
at = (1 + rt)at 1 + g    t   (itPt 1=Pt)mt 1; t  1: (25)
The governments solvency constraint, given in (26), is that the present discounted
value of the governments terminal non-monetary liabilities is non-positive. This in con-
trast to the household solvency constraint, given in (20), which requires the present
discounted value of the households terminal total net nancial liabilities, monetary and
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non-monetary, to be non-positive. The rationale for the asymmetric specication of the
private and public sectorssolvency constraints is that, while the household views money
as an asset that can be realised at any time, the government recognises that, unlike bonds,
unbacked base money is irredeemable or inconvertible. (see Buiter [6], [7]).11 Unbacked
base money is perceived to be an asset by the private sector, even in the long run, but is
not treated as an e¤ective liability in the long run by the government. Reecting this,
the governments solvency constraint is
lim
t!1
ft=
Qt
s=0(1 + rs)  0; (26)
where ft  bt + dt:
To demonstrate the possible existence of deationary bubbles when the government
issues non-monetary as well as monetary nancial instruments, we specify a simple gov-
ernment tax rule: we suppose that the government keeps the real value of its net stock
of debt (monetary and non-monetary) constant at the initial level a 1  0. From the
governments within-period budget constraint (25) it follows that taxes are given by
 t = g + rta 1   (itPt 1=Pt)mt 1: (27)
Under this tax rule, the discounted terminal value of the governments aggregate debt,
both monetary and non-monetary, is clearly zero. Thus, the government satises its
11This explains why there is no government solvency constraint in the money-only model of Section
2. If we were to impose, in the money-only model, a government solvency constraint analogous to (??),
we would have to constraint the terminal behaviour of the stock of money balances, in addition to the
sequence of within-period budget constraints given in (9). Precisely what this constraint would be is
not clear. It cannot be limt!1m=
Qt
s=0(1 + rs)  0; because there are no market interest rates in the
money-only model. Perhaps limt!1mtt  0 could be a candidate.
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solvency constraint (26).12 By (18) it follows that taxes are given by:
 t = g +

(1 + it)mt
mt 1
  1

a 1   itmt

: (28)
3.3 Market clearing
Market clearing requires that mdt = mt and a
d
t = at; t  0: As before, the resource
constraint implies that ct = c  y   g; t  0. Then by equations (18), (21) and (22) we
have the following denition:
Denition 9 A monetary equilibrium is a sequence of pairs f(mt; it)g1t=0 such that mt >
0 and it  0 for every t  0 and
uc(c;mt+1)mt+1 = [uc(c;mt)  um(c;mt)]mt; t  0 (29)
it+1 =
um(c;mt)
uc(c;mt)  um(c;mt) ; t  0 (30)
lim
t!1
tuc(c;mt)at = a 1 lim
t!1
tuc(c;mt) = 0: (31)
As before, a unique monetary steady state exists. It has the associated nominal
interest rate { = (  ) = and real interest rate r = (1  )=:
Deationary bubble paths result in the nominal interest rate going to zero and, by
(28) - (30),
 t ! g + 1  

a 1   lim
t!1
um(c;mt)mt
uc(c;mt)
: (32)
With constant real aggregate nancial liabilities (at = a 1; t  0), the households
transversality condition and the households and governments solvency constraints are
satised even when real money balances rise without bound and the present discounted
value of the terminal money stock is strictly positive. As the stock of real money balances
12This requires that long-run real interest rate is positive. With the restrictions we imposed to ensure
a unique monetary steady state, the long-run real interest rate will always be positive. Were this
not the case, setting at = 0; t  0 would guarantee solvency. The tax sequence would be given by
0 = g + (1 + r0)a 1   (i0P 1=P0)m 1 and  t = g   (itPt 1=Pt)mt 1; t  0:
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rises without bound along a deationary bubble path, the real value of government bonds
falls without bound, keeping the real value of the sum of these two portfolio components
constant.
Consider the example from the previous section where u(c;m) = h(c) + lnm: Taxes
are constant, since  t = g+(1 )a 1= ( ) m=(); and the real interest rate equals
(1 )=: Suppose  > :13 Thenmt = (m0  m) (=)t+ m and it = ( ) m=[mt 1 
(   ) m]: If m0 > m, then real balances go to innity and the nominal interest rate
goes to zero. If the nominal money stock is rising ( > 1); then tuc(c;mt)mt ! 1. It
follows that tuc(c;mt)(bt + dt)!  1 to keep limt!1 tuc(c;mt)at = 0: If the nominal
money stock is constant ( = 1); then tuc(c;mt)mt ! (m0   m)h0(c) and the present
discounted value of government bonds goes to  (m0   m)h0(c) .
Many other tax rules would support deationary bubbles in the money-and-bonds
model. They all share the property that if the present discounted value of real balances
goes to innity, the present discounted real value of government bonds goes to minus in-
nity, thus ensuring that the present discounted value of the aggregate nancial liabilities
of the government goes to zero in the long run.
Proposition 10 With a non-decreasing nominal money stock, deationary bubbles can-
not be ruled out when the government issues both money and bonds if the present dis-
counted value of governments terminal non-monetary liabilities can be negative (if  = 1)
or if they can go to minus innity (if  > 1).
The governments solvency constraint (26) requires the discounted value of its terminal
non-monetary debt to be non-positive. The scal rule at  ft+mt = a 1; t  0 that was
shown to support deationary bubbles ensures that the government solvency constraint
(26) is satised, sincemt  0. However, unless the present value of terminal real balances
is zero, (27) satises (26) with strict inequality. We now show that when the government
adopts instead of (27) a scal rule that ensures its solvency constraint is satised with
13The Friedman rule,  = , implies an an innite stock of real money balances, so there is no OQM
equilibrium that can be implemented in this case.
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equality, deationary bubbles cannot exist unless the growth rate of the nominal money
stock is negative.
An example of a tax rule that causes (26) to hold with equality is one that keeps
constant the real value of the governments bonds, that is, ft = f 1; t  0: This rule
is among the most common ad hoc rules in the macroeconomics literature. Associated
taxes are given by
 t = g + rtf 1  

  1


mt (33)
Proposition 11 If the government satises its solvency constraint (26) with equality,
then all of the Propositions for the money-only model of Section 2 hold for the model with
money and government debt.
Proof. Market clearing and equations (22) and (26) (with equality) imply
lim
t!1
tuc(c;mt)ft = 0: (34)
For the household sector, the combined solvency constraint and transversality condition
from the previous section, condition (24), continues to hold. This, market clearing and
(22) imply
lim
t!1
tuc(c;mt)at = 0: (35)
Together, equations (34) and (35) imply
lim
t!1
tuc(c;mt)mt = 0: (36)
The proof demonstrates that if the government solvency constraint holds with equal-
ity, then there is an equilibrium requirement that the present discounted value of the
terminal money stock be zero. This does not come solely from the households transver-
sality and solvency conditions, as was the case with the money-only model. Instead it
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is an implication of these conditions, the assumption of irredeemable money (and the
associated asymmetry between the household and government solvency constraints), the
requirement that the government solvency constraint hold with equality and the market-
clearing conditions. With the requirement restored that the present value of the terminal
money stock be zero, all propositions concerning the existence and non-existence of de-
ationary bubbles and about the GABOR condition, derived for the money-only model
in Section 2, now also apply unchanged in the money-and-bonds model.
Neither the specic rule in (33) nor the requirement that the governments solvency
constraint hold with equality are derived from optimising government behaviour. The
assumption that the governments solvency constraint holds with equality sounds sen-
sible, in that optimising private economic agents typically satisfy their budget con-
straints with equality - satiation in commodities is not a common feature of standard
models of household behaviour. Without the possibility of bubbles and with distor-
tionary taxes or real tax administration and compliance costs, a benevolent optimising
government would choose to satisfy its budget constraint with equality. However be-
cause of the possibility of bubbles, this assumption is not innocuous here. The rule
at = a 1; t  0 satises the governments constraint (26) of this section with strict
inequality unless limt!1mt=
Qt
s=0(1 + rs) = 0. If nominal money growth is strictly
positive, it can produce a deationary bubble. As welfare is higher in the deationary
bubble equilibrium than it would be in the associated fundamental equilibrium, house-
hold welfare is higher in a bubble equilibrium under the rule at = a 1; t  0 than it is
under the rule ft = f 1; t  0 which satises the budget constraint of this section with
equality and which supports only the fundamental equilibrium.14
When households can hold physical capital, but not government bonds, the logic of the
money-only model prevails, and deationary bubbles are not possible when the nominal
money stock is non-decreasing. The household transversality condition (23) would still
14We assume that the growth rate of the nominal money stock and the level of real public spending
are the same under both scal rules.
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hold, but with adt = m
d
t + k
d
t , where k
d
t is the households demand for real capital. Even
if an individual household can hold negative quantities of capital (equity), in equilibrium
the aggregate real capital stock is constrained to be non-negative and cannot play the
role of government bonds in permitting deationary bubbles.
In both the money-only and the money-and-bonds models we introduce a motive for
holding money and generate money demand functions that depend on the nominal interest
rate by including real money balances as an argument in the direct utility function, along
the lines pioneered by Sidrauski [32]. This way of introducing a motive for holding
money is not crucial for any of our results, however. Other ways of making the demand
for money sensitive to the nominal interest rate, such as a exible cash-in-advance model
with cash goods and credit goods (see, for example, Lucas and Stokey [24]) or a shopping,
time-savings model (see, for example, Feenstra [10]), would produce identical results to
those obtained here. Indeed, all our key results hold also for the constant-velocity cash-
in-advance models of Lucas [23], Helpman [17] and Sargent [30], Chapter 5.15
It is clear that none of the results depend on the interest-sensitivity of the demand
for real money balances. The key assumption that makes the household transversality
condition bite is that the marginal utility of consumption is positive. With the unitary
velocity of circulation of the simple cash-in-advance models (say Mt  Pt(ct + g); with
Mt = Pt(ct + g) if it > 0); and a period utility function u(c); with u increasing, twice
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly concave and satisfying the Inada conditions) dea-
tionary bubbles exist or fail to exist under the same conditions that they do with the
money in the utility function under Assumptions 1, 2A (satiation) and normality of real
money balances. The simple cash-in-advance model has the equivalent of satiationat
m^ = c+ g:
15Deationary bubbles cannot exist in an overlapping-generations model where money is the only store
of value and is only held as a store of value. Consider the case where households live for two periods,
only the young receive a positive endowment of the good and the nominal money stock is constant.
Consumption by the old then equals the value of the stock of real money balances. A deationary
bubble would mean that old consumersdemand for the good is growing without bound. As the amount
of the good supplied by the young is bounded above by the sum of their endowments, this cannot be an
equilibrium. See, for example, Hahn [15], p. 10.
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4 Deationary Bubbles in a Small Open Economy
This approach to the existence of deationary bubbles when the nominal money stock is
non-decreasing can be applied to the small open economy model of Obstfeld and Rogo¤
[29], pp. 536-543. This model has a single tradable commodity, a freely oating exchange
rate and perfect international capital mobility. The domestic household holds home and
foreign real bonds. Home money is held by the home household, but not by foreign
households. The world rate real interest rate of interest, r; is exogenous and assumed
to equal the domestic consumers time preference rate: rt = r = (1  ) =; t  0. The
government balances its budget each period and has no initial debt; hence ft = 0; t   1
and its within-period budget constraint is
Mt  Mt 1  Pt(g    t); t  0: (37a)
While the government does not borrow or lend, households can freely buy and sell
bonds on the international capital market. Let bt denote the time-t real value of net
household claims on the rest of the world. The households period budget constraint is
still (19), but now at  mt+bt : The household solvency constraint (20), and the household
optimality conditions (21), (22) and (23) are the same as in the closed economy model of
Sections 3 and 4. The closed economy resource constraint ct = y  g no longer constrains
private consumption. Instead, the private and public sector budget constraints imply the
nations within-period resource constraint is:
bt  (1 + r) bt 1 + y   g   ct: (38)
The household transversality and solvency conditions require that limt!1 
tuc(c;mt)
(mt+ b

t ) = limt!1(mt+ b

t )=(1+ r
)t = 0: This can be satised if the present discounted
value of the terminal money stock is strictly positive, provided the present discounted
value of the households terminal holdings of net external assets takes on a matching
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negative value.16 Because the government views money as non-redeemable, with no home
government non-monetary debt debt (ft = 0), the governments solvency condition 26 is
trivially satised as well.17
5 Conclusion
The paper ties up a number of loose ends in the deationary bubbles literature; we have
detailed our main results in the introduction. What remains to be done in future research
is a reconciliation of the neoclassical public nance approach to monetary policy, both
positive and normative, of which this paper is an example, and the more diverse and
eclectic literature on deation, debt deation, monetary policy ine¤ectiveness, nancial
fragility, recession and depression. This deationary crisis literature goes back at least to
Fisher [11], [12], Wicksell [35, 36], Keynes [20], and Hayek [16] and other Austrian School
economists and gures prominently in the more recent policy-oriented contributions of
authors like Bernanke [3], King [21] and Krugman [22]
In the neoclassical public nance approach, deation and zero nominal interest rates
are not a serious cause for concern. The deationary bubbles analysed in this paper all
support the maximum feasible level of private consumption as an equilibrium in every
period, and the real money stock converges to its satiation value or higher. The sta-
tionary Optimal Quantity of Money equilibrium, characterised by steady deation and
a zero nominal interest rate, represents the social optimum in the models considered in
our paper. In the deationary crisis literature, deation and the zero bound are to be
avoided and are a source of concern for monetary policy makers. The di¤erence between
the two approaches goes well beyond the fact that the deationary equilibria considered
in this paper concern fully anticipated deations, while the deationary crisis literature
16As the home country is small, this does not violate any foreign transversality condition. One might
argue, however, that if the home country is borrowing ever increasing amounts from the rest of the world
that the small economy assumption would eventually cease to be sensible, unless the rest of the world is
growing at a rate at least equal to the rate of interest.
17Obstfeld and Rogo¤ appeal to a GABOR argument to rule out deationary bubbles in this open
economy example also (see [29], pp. 542-543).
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is concerned with the response of the economic system to unexpected shocks - mainly
unexpected contractionary demand shocks (leading to baddeations) but also, more
recently, unexpected expansionary supply shocks (leading to gooddeations). The de-
ationary crisis literature uses models that emphasize nominal and real rigidities (both
ad-hoc nominal wage or price rigidities, and real rigidities based on asymmetric informa-
tion considerations), incomplete markets and non-competitive behaviour by enterprises
and nancial intermediaries. The gap between these two approaches is so wide that
it may not be possible to come up with a tractable analytical model that encompasses
them. However, both approaches o¤er important insights, and the hope that a synthesis
can be achieved that is more than the sum of the parts should encourage a renewed focus
on a research agenda that aims to join these two perspectives.
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